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Abstract
Background: Social and structural inequities shape health and illness; they are an everyday presence within the 
doctor-patient encounter yet, there is limited ethical guidance on what individual physicians should do. This paper 
draws on a study that explored how doctors and their professional associations ought to respond to the issue of social 
health inequities.
Results: Some see doctors as bound by a notion of care that is blind to a patient's social position, while others respond 
to this issue through invoking notions of justice and human rights where access to care is a prime focus. Both care and 
justice orientations however conceal important tensions linked to the presence of bioethical principles underpinning 
these. Other normative ethical theories like deontology, virtue ethics and utilitarianism do not provide adequate 
guidance on the problem of social health inequities either.
Conclusion: This paper explores if Bauman's notion of "forms of togetherness" provides the basis of a relational ethical 
theory that can help to develop a response to social health inequities of relevance to individual physicians. This theory 
goes beyond silence on the influence of social position of health and avoids amoral regulatory approaches to 
monitoring equity of care provision.
Background
The socially patterned nature of disease and illness is now
a commonplace understanding of health [1]. Social disad-
vantage and vulnerability, differences in income, occupa-
tional group and status, quality of housing and level of
education are not just distal and remote influences on the
health of a community. The impact of such influences is
felt by individuals, real patients who present in clinical
practice. Each of us takes our place in the inequitable
social gradient of health, embodying a lifetime of socially
patterned resources, choices and relationships that create
health and illness. The unequal lives of patients and the
health effects of social disadvantage are thus a daily real-
ity of medical care. The family physician particularly can-
not avoid the effects of social disadvantage in their
ongoing relationship with their patients. How to respond
to these inequities is challenging and there is a lack of
adequate ethical guidance on the matter.
Primary care occupies a unique place in the effort to
understand how physicians might respond to this issue as
it is so closely linked to the social world of the patient.
The primary care physician provides diagnosis, referral,
coordinates patient care, interprets health care systems
and translates complex information for patients in their
everyday community setting. Ideally the relationship
between patient and primary care physician is ongoing
and longitudinal, where doctors know their patients from
cradle to grave, a relationship premised on deep bio-
graphical knowledge of the person in the context of fam-
ily and community [2,3]. Increasingly fragmented and
discontinuous care [4] means that this idealised relation-
ship is under pressure, both in countries where primary
care has traditionally played a first contact "gate keeping"
role as well countries such as the United States where this
is not always the case. Nevertheless, across health sys-
tems primary medical care remains community-based
and generalist in focus.
Encounters with patients in primary care are thus an
unfiltered, complex meld of biology, psychology, histori-
cal and contemporary social and societal influences.
Family physicians negotiate this complexity and uncer-
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tainty as they account for the social, cultural and commu-
nity context of their patients in their diagnosis. It is in
these day to day encounters between family physician and
patient where ineluctably, the lives of individuals inter-
sect with the macro social and structural injustices that
permeate health experiences [5]. The primary care medi-
cal encounter offers a particularly useful place to begin an
exploration of how physicians ought to respond to the
moral problem of social health inequities. A response
seems warranted given that these issues are present in
everyday encounters between family physicians and
patients. Moreover, the delivery of medical care is not
only a scientific endeavour, but also a humanistic and
moral pursuit [6].
The family doctor and patient relationship has received
a great deal of attention in research. Ethics, sociology,
anthropology, philosophy and other fields of enquiry have
all struggled to understand this unique relational setting.
The doctor-patient relationship is now the subject of
intense interest within a "thriving multidisciplinary com-
munity of practitioners, educators and researchers"
[[5]:434]. Primary care research has particularly led this
enterprise [7]. Much of this interest and study has been
driven by a growing perception that medical care has
become technical, mechanistic, dehumanised and reduc-
tionist. The result has been an appreciation of the doctor-
patient relationship as unique and one that takes on
almost sacred qualities because the private suffering of
individuals is laid bare, complete with the troubles of fail-
ing and deteriorating human bodies.
Yet the focus on the relationship between physician and
patient has tended to push out of frame the important
structural and social factors shaping the health experi-
ences of patients. While many studies have examined
physician-patient communication [8-10], how social
health inequities are responded to or avoided within the
clinical encounter has been overlooked. Social health
inequities remain the "elephant in the room" [11], unac-
knowledged and silenced (intentionally and unintention-
ally) through collective endeavour. Four common
responses from physicians to the issue of social inequities
have been described which assist in silencing this issue
[12]. Some blame the victim for their disadvantage (a
common view across society as a whole). Some feel sym-
pathy but do not see it as part of their job to address
social problems. Some feel powerless to do anything
about wider forces operating in a patient's life. Others
address social disadvantage as best as they can in an
adhoc way. While each response has a rationale, together
they foster collective professional silence on its presence
in the encounter. This means that clear guidance on how
physicians might respond has not emerged.
In this paper we advocate for more active engagement
with social health inequities as an everyday aspect of pri-
mary medical care. Our view is that commonly drawn
upon normative ethical theories such as utilitarianism
and deontology, and the four bioethical principles --
respect for justice, beneficence, non-maleficence and
autonomy -- still keep social health inequities as an ele-
phant in the room. This is reflected in the common
responses to the problem outlined above. In this paper we
argue that 'three forms of togetherness' described by soci-
ologist Zygmunt Bauman can help to understand and
develop a response to social health inequities. These
forms of togetherness are described as being-aside, being-
with and being-for [13]. The ideal relationship being-for
builds on the ethical theory of philosopher Emmanuel
Levinas [14] and illustrates a relational approach to ethics
applicable to the medical encounter. It is our view that a
relational approach to social health inequities can over-
come some of the limitations of other normative ethical
theories and the traditionally applied four bioethical prin-
ciples.
Methods
To examine this moral dilemma, we present a re-analysis
of key findings of a study completed in 2002 that explored
how Australian family physicians and their national pro-
fessional association, the Royal Australian College of
General Practitioners (RACGP), should or could respond
to the issue of social inequities in health [15]. The study
involved a review of policy and program documents rele-
vant to the education, training, standard setting and
accreditation programs of the College. 80 semi-struc-
tured interviews with key representatives from national
committees, other family practice peak bodies, heads of
academic family practice university departments, con-
sumer groups and quality assurance organisations were
conducted. Data was also collected from two focus
groups held with 11 practicing primary care physicians
from both rural and urban settings of Australia. All data
collection focussed on the question of how the profession
should respond to the issue of social health inequities.
Although the study had implications for both profes-
sional medical associations and individual physicians,
this paper focuses on the role of individual physicians in
their routine medical practice. While the term "social dis-
advantage" can encompass a wide range of cultural, con-
textual and socioeconomic factors, this study focused
primarily on socioeconomic factors, and we retain that
focus in this paper. In this re-analysis, the initial study
findings are re-examined to identify the ethical limita-
tions of participants' views about how the profession
should respond to social health inequities. We combine
this with a critique of other existing normative ethical
theories such as virtue ethics, deontology and utilitarian-
ism and their limitations for addressing social health
inequities. We conclude with a theoretical exploration ofFurler and Palmer Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2010, 5:6
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Bauman's "three forms of togetherness" as a way to
develop a response to this moral dilemma.
Results: Two moral orientations and the survival of 
bioethical principles
The initial study results [15] found critical differences in
the values that different groups expressed on social health
inequities and physician responsibility. Participant
responses revealed two opposing moral orientations
closely related to those described by Gilligan of "care" and
" j u s t i c e " .  G i l l i g a n ' s  [ 1 6 ]  t e r m  " m o r a l  o r i e n t a t i o n "
describes how women reason about moral dilemmas
using an ethic of care, while men's reasoning draws on
justice and rights. Gilligan's argument is that women
express a "different moral voice" to men. According to
Friedman, [[17]:117] this voice has been overlooked in
"the typical moral perspective...oriented toward matters
of justice and rights and dominated by abstract princi-
ples". Self et al summarise the two moral orientations:
"[P]ersons who exemplify a justice orientation view
relationships in terms of inequality versus equality
and in terms of mutuality and reciprocity. One who
adopts this orientation asks, "What is fair for all
involved in a situation"? Justice thus connects vulner-
ability with oppression...By contrast, from the orien-
tation of care, relationships are characterised not by
equality and inequality but attachment versus detach-
ment. Care connects vulnerability with the moral
issues of support versus abandonment, not with
oppression and inequality" [[18]:55].
In this study, participants expressed both orientations
of justice and care, but they were not linked to gender.
Little [[19]:192], in line with Friedman, suggests the ori-
entation of justice in particular appeals to impartial prin-
ciples. Justice emphasises the importance of deliberating
from a dispassionate stance where moral issues are dealt
with by referring to rights of equality and non-interfer-
ence. As an example, a family physician talking with a
patient about the patient's injecting drug use could see
this as primarily an issue of autonomy. Information
should be given to the patient about drug related harm
and potential impacts on health and clearly they should
be advised to take precautions to avoid harm. However, in
the end the issue of the patient's social world as an impor-
tant factor can be silenced if this is seen simply as a mat-
ter of free-will and the patient's right to choose. Not
interfering by deciding not to give information about the
impacts and harms of drug use appears to be ethically
justifiable because to intervene is to impinge on the indi-
vidual's autonomy.
In contrast, the care orientation resists closure; it is
sceptical about algorithmic principles, is receptive to
details of context and values, and reasons through a
stance of emotional engagement. Care connects a person
with a moral responsibility to respond. In the patient's
drug use example, the issue cannot be reduced to a ques-
tion of rights and choices but rather considered as a con-
textual reality affecting and interacting with the
individual's health. Because of the relationship between
social disadvantage and adversity, injecting drug use and
health outcomes there is the possibility and opening for
patient and doctor to bring this complex problem into
their encounter, which does not necessarily end if the
patient continues drug use. In the care orientation the
boundaries of responsibility flow out as the physician is
seen as needing to respond to all aspects of patient health
not just the disease and illness.
As Little [19] highlighted moral orientations do not
automatically translate to moral theories for action. From
an ethical perspective, Gilligan's care and justice orienta-
tions may be more "fruitful material for exploring ... the
ethics of normatively substantive relationships", relation-
ships characterised by "normative essence" or "norma-
tively construed telos" [16]. Little argues that the
orientations are best understood as "gestalts" that shape
perceptions of self and other and are active in the way
nuances, preferences and attitudes shape day-to-day
behaviour.
The manner in which orientations shape perceptions of
self and other is illustrated in participant responses in the
study. For example, some participants contested the
notion that the task of medicine lies beyond the physi-
cian's immediate, natural and essential responsibility to
address individual suffering. It is the individual patient's
and his/her illness that is responsible. Acting to address
the social inequity and disadvantage embodied in a
patient's presentation was outside of the profession and
individual doctors' responsibility. This group of partici-
pants acknowledged that the College could (but had no
responsibility to) help to raise awareness about the issue
amongst family physician members. They suggested
developing educational resources and learning activities
focused on health inequity. Exposing new trainee family
physicians to work in socio-economically disadvantaged
settings was thought to be valuable. However, the moral
responsibility of family physicians and the profession was
one of simply providing each individual patient with high
quality clinical care. To demonstrate:
"[M]y personal feeling is that the College should be
about training general practitioners [family physi-
cians] and keeping its members as expert as possible.
I don't know that the College really needs to take on a
role beyond that in term of society's wellbeing. It does
that by providing good doctors" (Focus Group GP
Participant).
Quite clearly, addressing distal notions of societal
causes of illness and disease is secondary and incidental
to being a "good" doctor.Furler and Palmer Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2010, 5:6
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Others focused on healing work with individual
patients aligned with Gilligan's care orientation (although
not related to gender here), but highlighting the problem
of universal treatment in medical care:
"[Y]ou can't practice medicine for different socioeco-
nomic groups. you practice medicine for the whole
community" (Focus Group GP Participant).
To go beyond providing the best possible clinical care
for each individual patient was thought to be dangerous,
undermining the moral focus of doctoring. To start iden-
tifying and accounting for an individual patient's life
within a social hierarchy was a slippery path. By caring
for everyone equally, somehow blind to the wider social
context at play in the illness trajectory of patients' lives,
each individual patient will be assured of the care they
need, and close attachment between doctor and patient
will be maintained. Silence about social health inequities
is actively at work here.
Silence, as intimated earlier, is maintained through col-
lective endeavours of how individuals and professions
respond (or do not) to issues [11]. Professions for exam-
ple limit the scope of their member's attention, providing
informal and formal rules of denial that shape notions of
what is relevant to practice, providing the mechanism
through which selected issues and situations remain
nameless. Thus, professional associations do have a role
to play in addressing moral matters, but their role is not
our focus in this work. At the level of the individual
encounter, Mishler has described the strategies through
which silence can be managed by doctors:
"[P]hysicians controlled the flow of the clinical inter-
view: (1) through their ways of asking questions; (2)
by interrupting patients' efforts to say more than was
asked for, often in the form of stories; and (3) by
ignoring, that is, refusing to acknowledge or respond
to, patients' accounts of the effects on their daily lives
of symptoms of their illness"[5].
Such notions of socialised silence and denial shape
encounters between individual family physician and
patients.
There are two types of silence illustrated in the above
examples. First there is a silence about the social basis of
much of the illness and suffering encountered in primary
care. Avoiding the reality that we are not all equal in the
social lives we lead, or the health consequences of this,
generates a sense of universalism whereby physicians
pride themselves on delivering health care equally to
everyone, but unintentionally ignore social health inequi-
ties. Second, there is a silence about the convincing evi-
dence that doctors themselves are actively involved in
generating and sustaining social hierarchies of illness
care. This occurs through differential treatment of
patients based on social and demographic characteristics
such as race, ethnicity, gender and education [20-22].
In contrast to physicians, leaders of the profession and
academics saw the matter of responding to social health
inequities quite differently. While physicians tended to
draw on a care orientation, this group constructed social
health inequities as an issue of equitable and just access
to medical care and the rights of vulnerable communities:
"[O]ur value system has been a bit lost. No-one is
even talking about whose duty of care it is to provide
care for disadvantaged sections of the community.
Neither state nor medical schools seem to take it on"
(External Interview Respondent).
Addressing health inequities for these participants
meant mandating and regulating aspects of the work of
individual practitioners as well as the profession as a
whole. Physicians for example should monitor and be
accountable for ensuring that preventive care reaches
vulnerable and disadvantaged groups in their practice
community. The physician's response is through provid-
ing access to care.
H e r e  s o c i a l  h e a l t h  i n e q u i t i e s  i s  v e r y  m u c h  a n  i s s u e
within the remit not only of the profession but, impor-
tantly, individual doctors as well. Yet, the focus is more
w i d e l y  o n  t h e  s o c i a l  s t r u c t u r e s  a n d  c o n t e x t s  t h a t  s u r -
round medical care and clinical encounters. The tension
raised by this position rests is the potential to create an
institutionalised and bureaucratised vision of medical
care driven by monitoring and accounting that is at risk of
undermining the very humanistic values that it seeks to
defend. As May [23] describes, the rising levels of chronic
care and the intrusion of funders and managers and sys-
tems for monitoring and accountability into the doctor-
patient relationship are transforming the notion of
"patient-hood" and the work of primary care physicians.
Reponses to health inequities framed within a justice ori-
entation tended to implicitly draw on such a regulated
and highly specified vision of clinical care. The examples
we have provided so far reveal that there are limits to
both the justice and care orientations being used as a
guide for action. This may be related to how respect for
justice, beneficence, non-maleficence and autonomy can
be interpreted by individuals holding these orientations
as shown in Table 1.
Our re-examination of the data indicates that justice,
beneficence, non-maleficence and autonomy [24] con-
tinue to underpin both the justice and care orientations.
Although the care orientation is ethically preferable to
the justice orientation in the way that the principles are
articulated through connection, the problem of universal-
ity remains an issue. Justice would suggest that benefi-
cence and non-maleficence are upheld by advocating for
each patient, leveraging resources and access to care, pre-
mised on an understanding of the social and structural
limits the patient lives within and the impact on illness.
On the other hand, in the care orientation beneficence isFurler and Palmer Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2010, 5:6
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upheld by ensuring the continuous healing presence of
the physician, un-distracted by extraneous social and
societal influences. Patients are free and autonomous
only through the physician's pursuit of these apparently
opposing strategies, which is a fairly one-sided view of
the doctor-patient relationship. Justice will be done by
righting inequities of access on the one hand, while
through unconditional acceptance on the other.
Accounting for social context need not lead to a
bureaucratic inhumane form of medical care or blindness
to socioeconomic factors underpinning the health impact
of social disadvantage. Experiential knowledge and bio-
graphical information, gathered over time allows a physi-
cian to treat the patient as a person, more than simply a
means to an end [25]. Inequities and social disadvantage
can be engaged with through sharing in patient's lives
over time and helping those who are suffering and
oppressed, not just knowing illness and treatment. How-
ever to achieve this, something more than the moral ori-
entations and four bioethical principles is required.
Unfortunately, normative ethical theories like virtue eth-
ics, deontology and utilitarianism do not provide ade-
quate guidance either.
The internal morality of medical care: Pellegrino's 
ethical theory and Wilde's critique
To explain these limitations of normative ethical theories,
Pellegrino for example has long claimed that the physi-
cian-patient encounter is "the starting point for a philoso-
phy of medicine and the root of its internal morality" [26].
Medical care has teleological ends that refer to the good
of the patient and their return from poor health to better
health; ideally the "making whole again" of the sick.
Where such a transformation is not possible, caring and
comforting, simply being a part of how patients live with
illness or disease is medicine's healing purpose. Pel-
legrino argues that this internal morality springs from the
essence of medical care, its nature; "to care and heal". He
sees the common meaning of encounters between healer
and patient across cultures, place and history as evidence
of the intrinsic phenomenological nature of clinical medi-
cine as a form of practice with its own internal morality.
Pellegrino asserts that to argue otherwise is to relegate
medical practice to being "an instrument of social and
political purpose and the physician [to the role of] social
functionary" [[26]: 177]. Pellegrino's view is that the virtu-
ous physician hears the call for help from the patient and
responds.
Wildes [27], in a critique of Pellegrino's philosophy,
highlights the potential problem of 'silence' contained
within this position however. Wildes argues that "to focus
solely on the physician-patient encounter is an incom-
plete phenomenology (of medical practice) since the
encounter is shaped by the presence of others, as well as
the structures that make the encounter possible"
[[27]:79]. For Wildes and others medical care is at its core
a form of social practice, intimately entwined with the
social structures, relations of power and institutional set-
tings that make it possible and without which it would
not exist. In this view any ethical theory or philosophy of
Table 1: Expressions of the four principles of bioethics within the two moral orientations
Social Justice and Human Rights Care and compassion for the vulnerable
Beneficence Doing good involves ensuring the 
individual gets the health care they need 
even when their social position limits their 
opportunities for health achievement (this 
may involve reorienting services: ensuring 
services are available, accessible and 
appropriate).
Doing good involves providing the best 
available clinical care to each individual 
within a compassionate, caring and 
empathic context.
Non Maleficence Doing harm involves paying no attention 
to the social contextual factors at play in a 
patient's illness presentation and 
experience.
Doing harm involves changing the care 
one provides on the basis of a person's 
social position. Everyone should be 
treated in the same way.
Autonomy Promoting autonomy involves helping 
individuals overcome the social limits that 
frame their choices through full 
information to promote access to clinical 
care.
Autonomy flows from the full attention, 
support and engagement of the clinician 
in a relational encounter.
Justice Justice is premised on the notion of natural 
rights to equitable access to health care as 
an element of a free, dignified and 
meaningful life.
Justice will ensue if practitioners see 
beyond a patient's social context to the 
person within. Physicians have a duty to 
respond to inequities through caring for 
patients from all backgrounds.Furler and Palmer Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2010, 5:6
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medical care must engage with the social and societal
n a t u r e  o f  m e d i c a l  p r a c t i c e  o r  r i s k  i r r e l e v a n c e  t o  b o t h
practitioners and patients.
Pellegrino [26] rightly worries about the outcome of
allowing a socially constructed purpose for medical care
defined external to the profession and its calling. For Pel-
legrino the role of the physician is to heal the individual
patient. Responsibility for addressing the health effects of
societal inequities lies outside of medicine, outside of its
moral remit. Yet the elephant remains in the room and
the question persists -- how should physicians respond to
individual patients suffering the health effects of social
inequity? If the purpose of medicine is a duty to make
whole again, there must be an engagement with the social
dimensions of patient's lives causing them ill-health.
The problem of how to respond to social health inequi-
ties is not resolved by turning to utilitarianism either. The
theoretical focus to act in the interests of the greater good
for the greatest number means that if the patient's health
with its basis in social inequity is not considered a part of
the greater good, there is no great compulsion on the
physician's part to act. Adopting a deontological position
that it is one's duty to act does not bring the elephant out
of the room either. Applying the categorical imperative of
"acting only according to the maxim that you can will to
become universal law" [28] cannot solve the highly indi-
vidualised nature of inequities.
Even the modern day version of the Hippocratic Oath,
the Geneva Declaration expresses a position of equal,
universal treatment and the physician's obligation to care:
"[T]he health of my patient will be my first consider-
ation [...] I will not permit considerations of religion,
nationality, race, party politics or social standing to
intervene between my duty and my patient" [29].
This notion of universal and equal treatment of patients
regardless of their social position suggests physicians
should remain impartial and "practice medicine for the
whole community not socio-economic groups". However
we have learned from Aristotle's position on justice that
universal treatment represents one of the greatest injus-
tices - the equal treatment of unequals does not ensure
distributive justice [30]. If we treat everyone equally then
social inequities remain effectively denied and silenced.
It is surprising given the quotidian nature of this issue
that the primary care profession has not engaged in vig-
orous debate about or reached a consensus on the extent
of its responsibility in relation to social disadvantage. Our
critique indicates that we still need to develop ethical
guidance on this matter. What may be required is a con-
ceptual shift in how social health inequity is understood
within the medical encounter.
Beyond moral orientations
For family physicians there are few ethical theories that
can guide action to transform and address social inequi-
ties. Appreciating the moral orientations and the nuances
of the way they are at work helps to illuminate where phy-
sicians place their boundaries of moral responsibility in
relation to social health inequities, but it does not ensure
active engagement. As a set of reductionist propositions
they cannot "articulate well what, in the end, influences
most what we believe and how we are in the world"
[[19]:207]. Rather than the application of sets of princi-
ples that ultimately end up outweighing each other [31],
an important starting point is the grounded development
of an ethical theory applicable to the day-to-day clinical
encounter.
Patient-centred practice [32] might be seen as offering
potential for resolution of some of the difficulties we have
outlined. Here care is tailored according to a patient's
context, accounting for the whole person needs. There is
an emphasis on shared decision-making, a holistic under-
standing of the patient and a complete bio-psycho-social
assessment of a patient's problem. This approach
attempts to deal with the inequities of power between
patients and physicians and offers a framework for bring-
ing the patient's social world into the everyday encounter.
However, in reality physicians tend to deal with the bio-
psychological and less with the social [33] and the
patient-centred model remains excessively individualised.
The challenge lies in delineating the boundaries around
how and how far physicians can go in addressing underly-
ing social factors at play in a patient's ill-health. Some of
this is related to how our relationships with others are
understood.
Forms of togetherness: developing a response
The three forms of togetherness Bauman [13] described
go some way to developing a response to this dilemma of
social health inequities. This is because the three kinds of
encounters  being-aside,  being-with  and  being-for  can
assist to explain and understand how we engage with oth-
ers in ways that yield different moral consequences.
Understanding this engagement and the moral conse-
quences of this can be used to break the silence on social
health inequities. In this final section we draw on the
example of uninsured patients in the U.S. to illustrate the
forms of togetherness and their application to this one
issue of the effects of social health inequities.
In a crowd at a railway station, sitting in adjacent cars in
a traffic jam, passing familiar but unknown faces, to and
fro, each day is being-aside. Being-aside is an "on the side"
encounter, where other people are recognised simply as
co-present entities with no vested interests. While we
might naturally feel that being-aside  is antithetical to
medical care and practice and rarely seen in that setting,
when it comes to responding to social health inequities
many do remain on the side. The case of uninsured
p a t i e n t s  i n  t h e  U . S .  i n  n e e d  o f  u r g e n t  h e a l t h  c a r e  b u tFurler and Palmer Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2010, 5:6
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unable to gain access resembles the encounter of being-
aside.
The movement into being-with  at least signals the
beginning of recognition of others. This relation is exem-
plified for instance when a physician treats an uninsured
patient because of their call for help, and because it is the
right thing to do. In this response, there is a beginning
recognition that the other needs assistance. Bauman says
the entities which were on the side gain attention and
take shape as persons, however:
"[b]eing-with  is still a mis-meeting of incomplete
beings, of deficient selves [where] not more of the self
tends to be deployed in the encounter than the topic-
at-hand demands; and no more of the other is high-
lighted than the topic at hand permits" [[13]:50].
Being-with reflects a relationship based on transaction
and utility, an exchange of goods, a form of quid-pro-quo,
and user pay systems. Recognition of the other is based
on a cognitive expression of need; responsibility ends at
the completion of the transaction. In the case of unin-
sured patients, being-with means the patient continues to
have no access to full health care services. There has been
a temporary alleviation of need and while this encounter
has been encouraged by relational qualities like compas-
sion and sympathy, the more enduring feature of a sus-
tained responsibility is not present.
Certainly, the moral consequences of being-with  are
starkly different from being-aside. Indeed, it is not diffi-
cult to see here some of the moral consequences of frag-
mented, "de-humanised" health care systems. Patients
and doctors face pressures to be efficient in their deal-
ings. Modern patients are expected to be active, resource-
ful and prudent in their use of health care resources [34].
Doctors must meet quality and administrative targets,
and are increasingly accountable to funders for their
work. How is it that we move beyond being-with to the
ideal relation of being-for?
Being-for i s  p r e m is ed  o n  a bs o l u t e  r ec o gn i t i o n  o f  o u r
otherness (alterity) and a dialogical relation of intercon-
nection shaped by the inability to finalise another by
speaking for them or trying to become the other. Being-
for is an ontological space of togetherness, an ideal form
of togetherness, that occurs in the act of transcendence,
from seeing and being-with  "something" to being-for
"someone". Physicians who treat uninsured patients
might share some of these qualities, but being-for is dif-
ferent from having empathy for another's suffering where
"my projecting what would make me feel better onto you,
or my fusing with suffering could result in unification"
[[35]:116]. In being-for the recognition of the human face
of the other is an embodied feeling which compels one to
respond to another's needs, but not to the point of having
all of the answers and closing the relationship off. Being-
for  makes dialogue between two people possible and
there is a realisation that "who you are depends on who I
am" [[35]:118].
Being-for recognises the preciousness of the other, their
full properties and their identity and it is a relation that
does mean social health inequities can be an actively
acknowledged as part of the relationship and our alterity.
For example, Forester and Heck [36] complete a simple
act of being-for by talking with uninsured patients about
the differences in the costs of accessing primary care ser-
vices compared to their health deteriorating to the point
of needing hospitalisation. Rather than leaving this
unsaid as a matter of their patient's choice, the physicians
introduce dialogue about this because they recognise that
who they are affects who the patient is and what they will
become. They also recognise that caring for uninsured
patients is part of a higher moral purpose, for them it is a
reminder of what being a family physician is all about.
While it may be said that recognising our differences
still does not address the issue of responding directly to
inequities, a change such as that outlined by Forester and
Heck in how we respond to the issue of social health
inequities has moral consequences. This ontological shift
in fact makes inequities and differences a part of our rela-
tionships, and although the example we have provided
relates to the particular case of the insured in the U.S,
there are patients who have financial difficulties in
accessing various parts of the health service in all health
care systems. There are responses that physicians can
make to their needs which begin with the acknowledge-
ment that we do not stand together universally, devoid of
socio-economic grouping and cultural context. To make
even this small shift there are barriers to overcome. For
example professional training of doctors fosters distance
and encourages neutrality and silence on such matters
[37], political systems encourage choice and individual
autonomy. Developing the relation of being-for is possible
however within the day to day primary care medical
encounter.
This need not be overwhelming for clinicians, faced
with a full waiting room of patients and the responsibility
and seeming impossibility of acting on the social and
societal forces embodied in each. "Being for" starts before
and goes beyond any of these. Being-for does not ignore
the critical exchanges that must occur as day to day ill-
ness care proceeds, rather it provides a way of being
together that infuses these. For the physician it demands
a reflexive awareness of the way they may contribute to
shaping the encounter, sensitivity to questions that might
bring foreclosure, limit responses and create silence. It
also demands that patients too come to recognise the
physician with their uniqueness and alterity.
"Being with" in a transactional clinical exchange may
improve access to aspects of care and bring compliance,
adherence and achievement of quality care targets, butFurler and Palmer Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2010, 5:6
http://www.peh-med.com/content/5/1/6
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crossing over to being-for may provide a basis for action
on social health inequities, bring personal reward and
work toward a better health care system.
We have outlined that the impartiality of principled
based ethics does not allow us to see or share the embod-
ied nature of social injustice and suffering in patients and
physician in their togetherness. Institutions fall short in
their responses because they either see social disadvan-
tage as the individual's responsibility or it is not within
the remit of the greater good. Before we can adequately
grapple with this question, however, it seems necessary to
re-acknowledge the moral imperative physicians and
their professional associations have to respond to social
health inequities in their everyday practice and the possi-
bility of doing so. How we think about this problem of
social health inequities needs much greater examination.
The application and implementation of these three forms
of togetherness can highlight some of the moral conse-
quences of the different kinds of relationships doctors
and patients engage in.
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